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Misrecognition, social stigma, and COVID-19 




As social and interdependent beings, we have responsibilities to each other. One of them is to 
recognize each other appropriately. When we fail to meet this responsibility, we often stigmatize. 
In this paper, I argue that the COVID-19-related stigmatization is a variation of the lack of 
recognition understood as an orientation to our evaluative features. Various stereotypical 
behaviors regarding COVID-19 become stigmatized practices because of labeling, stereotyping, 
separation, status loss and discrimination, and power. When people stigmatize COVID-19 
victims, they orient themselves to their evaluative quality of being vulnerable to the SARS-CoV-
2 virus by internalizing the victims as dangerous, understanding them as separable, and being 
motivated to act with them differently. All this causes the COVID-19 victims to lose status and 
suffer discrimination for which they do not experience participatory parity in different facets of 
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1. | INTRODUCTION 
For being social and interdependent, we need each other for our well-being. Since the beginning 
of our existence, we depend on others, for example, for our food and survival.1 We also need 
people to be shaped as individuals livable in a society in which we find ourselves.2 Because of 
the varying nature of our dependencies, we form a network of relationships with various people. 
But to regulate these interdependent relationships, we have to follow various customs of society. 
One of these customs is to meet our responsibilities to each other through offering due 
recognition to others which is an important feature of a thriving community. But the failure to 
meet the normative expectation of recognition as members of society leads to various practices 
of dehumanization and discrimination. The central theme of this paper is that one of these 
practices is stigmatization which is, in fact, a variation of misrecognition. To be precise, in this 
paper, I offer an original account that argues that various stigmas seen during the ongoing 
COVID-19 pandemic are instances of a deep-rooted societal problem of misrecognition.3 
 To this end, I divide the paper into three sections: the first two are theoretical, and the 
third will apply this theory to a specific context. In the first section, I offer, albeit very briefly, an 
account of recognition. I end this section with a definition of recognition that I believe is 
comprehensive but still in need of more explanation than I offer in this paper. The second section 
is a succinct attempt to connect this definition of recognition with the standard understanding of 
social stigma. This section intends to show how social stigma can be defined based on the earlier 
 
1 Sloman, S., & Fernbach, P. (2017). The Knowledge Illusion: Why We Never Think Alone. New York: Riverhead 
Books. pp. 109-110. 
2 Elias, N. (1991). The Society of Individuals. Translated by Edmund Jephcott, and edited by Michael Schröter. New 
York: Continuum. p. 22; Baier, A. (1985). Postures of the Mind: Essays on Mind and Morals. Minneapolis, MN: 
The University of Minnesota Press. p. 90. 
3 Note that when I speak of misrecognition in the paper, I refer to any of the following: failure of recognition, lack of 
recognition, excessive recognition, non-recognition, misrecognition, and the like. 
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definition of recognition. The last section exemplifies how the COVID-19-related stigmas are 
instances of misrecognition, offering a few cases from Bangladesh’s context. In this paper, I 
single out the Bangladesh context4 to illustrate cases of misrecognition of COVID-19-related 
stigmas, although the prevalence of such misrecognition is not peculiar to only Bangladesh. The 
use of a single context is justified because it prevents the study from being excessively simplistic 
since it acknowledges the variety of situations in which misrecognizing incidents occur.5 
Utilizing illustrations from Bangladesh, it is shown that a society that is already torn by various 
levels of discrimination is a breeding ground of social stigma and misrecognition. 
2. | RECOGNITION DEFINED 
Recognition may be defined as one’s orientation to others’ evaluative features.6 When we orient 
ourselves to something, we do the following: commit to others’ evaluative qualities, internalize 
the relevant reasons, realize the relevant responsibilities, motivate to fulfill these responsibilities, 
and show subsequent appropriate behavior.7 These five are the necessary stages of recognition. 
The absence of any of them implies the failure to recognize. 
 
4 Mahmud, A., & Islam, M.R. (2020). Social Stigma as a Barrier to Covid-19 Responses to Community Well-Being 
in Bangladesh. International Journal of Community Well-Being. Advance Online Publication. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s42413-020-00071-w. 
5 Huda, K.A.S.M.N. (2021) Micro-credit NGOs and Strategic Trust: An Odd Couple? Business Ethics, the 
Environment & Responsibility, 30(3), 360–377; Modood, T., & Thompson, S. (2018). Revisiting Contextualism in 
Political Theory: Putting Principles into Context. Res Publica, 24(3), 339–357; Ojong, N., & Simba, A. (2018). 
Trust-building Mechanisms in Group-based Microfinance: A Cameroonian Perspective. Forum for Social 
Economics. 49(2), 180–201. 
6 This definition of recognition is different from Ikäheimo’s: “recognition is a process where a person attributes in 
her attitudes certain relevant attributes to another person – whether in explicit speech acts, or implicitly in her 
overall orientation in the shared world – and the other person has a positively evaluative attitude towards the 
attribution, or ‘accepts’ it.” See Ikäheimo, H. (2002). On the Genus and Species of Recognition. Inquiry: An 
Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. 45(4), 447-62. p. 456. It is also different from Laitinen who understands the 
act of recognition as a response to already independently existing evaluative features that “give us prima facie 
reasons to treat them in ways consistent with their value.” See Laitinen, A. (2002). Interpersonal Recognition: A 
Response to Value or a Precondition of Personhood? Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. 45(4), 
463-478. p. 467. The differences between my definition of recognition and theirs need a separate discussion that I 
avoid here for the sake of brevity. 
7 Raz offers a model that discusses the three-stage response to value. See Raz, J. (2001). Value, Respect and 
Attachment. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. pp. 161-164. Laitinen also has a four-stage process of 
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Consider, for example, that Maria, a 7th-grade student, needs special attention to be better 
in mathematics. Her teacher, Alam, commits to the fact that Maria needs special care to do well 
in mathematics. But committing to Maria’s this feature is not enough for recognizing. Alam 
needs to check in each of the other stages of recognition. He has to internalize the normatively 
relevant reasons supported by Maria’s need for special care. This stage involves weighing 
various reasons and select one which is more weighty than the others. When one has an 
internalized commitment to someone’s evaluative feature, we may say that she now knows that 
evaluative feature. In our example, Alam now knows that Maria needs special attention to do 
better in mathematics. But knowing is not doing. To do something, we need to realize what our 
relevant responsibilities are. In our example, Alam needs to know what he should do to help 
Maria better in mathematics, which may include giving her more time beyond regular classes, 
assigning more homework, among other things. However, we know a lot of things in our daily 
life without feeling motivated to act accordingly. For acting on what Maria needs, Alam must 
have motivational emotion. If Alam is not motivated to behave responsibly to Maria’s need for 
special attention, he fails to recognize Maria’s evaluative quality. Again, we often know why and 
what we need to do. We also become so motivated to act appropriately. But knowing and 
motivating to act are not the same. Alam may know and feel motivated to help Maria. But he 
may have competing motivation. He may have a more substantial reason to engage with a 
different feature, as it often happens in the teacher-student relationship. Though Maria needs 
special attention, Alam may feel that he has done all things he can do to help Maria in exchange 
for the money the school he works in pays him. It shows that knowing that we have 
responsibilities concerning an evaluative feature does not mean that we have fulfilled those 
 
recognition of value. See Laitinen, A. (2006). Interpersonal Recognition and Responsiveness to Relevant 
Differences. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy. 9(1), 47-70. pp. 54-55. 
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responsibilities. The externalization of these responsibilities through actions is required for 
successful recognition. One way of externalizing our internalization is socialization, through 
which people constantly learn others’ evaluative qualities. 
The acts of recognition occur when an appropriate connection between commitment, 
internalization, realization, motivation, and externalization comes off through the process of 
socialization. Hence, the relations of recognition should be viewed as “a bundle of customs that, 
in the process of socialization, are linked to revisable grounds for the value or worth of other 
persons.”8 The legitimacy of a particular custom of valuing an evaluative feature depends on its 
contribution to societal well-being. If, for example, a society values a specific skin color, then 
people with different skin colors will have no or less opportunity to thrive, which makes such a 
custom illegitimate. To determine whether an evaluative quality should be recognized, Axel 
Honneth, a pioneer of recognition theory that follows Hegelian tradition, proposes the following 
criterion: “it is the increases in individuality and social inclusion that jointly indicate progress in 
social acts of recognition.”9 If a new evaluative quality advances individuality and social 
inclusion, it deserves to be recognized. This point becomes more apparent if we accept Nancy 
Fraser’s, an anti-Hegelian pioneer of recognition theory, a criterion of participatory parity – 
understood as the general meaning of justice that requires “participating on a par with others, as 
full partners in social interaction”10 – to determine the legitimacy of a recognition claim. 
According to her, “only those claims that promote participatory parity are morally justified.”11 
 
8 Honneth, A. (2002). Grounding Recognition: A Rejoinder to Critical Questions. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary 
Journal of Philosophy. 45(4), 499-519. p. 508. 
9 Honneth, op. cit. note 6, p. 511. 
10 Fraser, N. (2007). Re-framing Justice in a Globalizing World. In T. Lovell (Ed.), (Mis)recognition, Social 
Inequality and Social Justice: Nancy Fraser and Pierre Bourdieu (pp. 17-35). London: Routledge. p. 20; Fraser, N. 
(2009). Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World. New York: Columbia University 
Press. p. 16. 
11 Fraser, N. (2003). Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, and Participation. In 
N. Fraser, & A. Honneth (Eds.), Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange (pp. 7-109). 
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Intuitively, if a criterion supports autonomy and inclusion, it can incorporate them. For this 
reason, on the surface, the standard of parity of participation has the theoretical clout to 
encompass the standards of individuality and social inclusion that Honneth employs to measure 
the legitimacy of a recognition claim. Despite having many differences in their details of the 
standards – i.e., participatory parity and individuality and social inclusion, at least apparently, 
they do not seem conflicting. In this article, I do not intend to flesh out their differences. What I 
intend is to say is that there are criteria in the recognition literature that we can use to determine 
whether recognition of an evaluative feature is justified or not. 
In this paper, the norm I prefer to determine the legitimacy of a recognition claim is 
participatory parity that can, without much complication, easily respond to the question of why 
recognition is a moral action. If we merely say that our acts of recognition of someone’s 
evaluative qualities are justified because, in so doing, we commit ourselves to the facts of the 
world, it is not enough because mere commitment to the fact does not deliver the required force 
of the normative oughtness of the action. Many things are facts, still committing to them is 
normatively trivial. For example, we commit to the fact that Kabir is wearing a red shirt. It is 
morally insignificant because wearing a red shirt does not (usually) impede others’ parity of 
participation. Since the acts of recognition are “oriented not towards one’s own aims but rather 
towards the evaluative qualities of others,”12 others’ evaluative qualities should be considered in 
determining the morality of recognition that are valuable so long they promote participatory 
parity. It shows that our acts of recognition are moral because they “constrain our actions in a 
 
Translated by J. Golb, J. Ingram, & C. Wilke. London: Verso. p. 46; Fraser, N. (2001). Recognition without Ethics? 
Theory, Culture & Society. 18(2-3), 21-42. p. 31. 
12 Honneth, op. cit., note 6, p. 513. 
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non-egoistical manner”13 that contribute to individual and collective well-being by promoting 
parity of participation. 
Since the norm of participatory parity requires everyone’s participation as peers in social 
interaction, it turns our attention to an issue that I am yet to discuss: whether and how one’s 
evaluative qualities are structural. Cultural, economic, and political structural features influence 
our recognition of others’ evaluative qualities. Our recognition of others’ evaluative qualities is 
structural because it is constrained by various economic, cultural, and political factors that work 
in the background dictating what to be recognized and what not. Hence, misrecognition as a 
complementary idea of recognition can not only occur in the five stages I mentioned above, but it 
can also take place at the level of structures by denying one’s status as a full partner in social 
interaction. Considering all this, recognition can be defined as an orientation to others’ 
evaluative qualities that, when appropriately internalized, one’s value system rationally 
motivates him to avoid treating others wrongfully, and he externalizes this motivation by acting 
accordingly, overcoming or compensating for structural elements when they are unfavorable. 
3. | SOCIAL STIGMA 
The above-mentioned understanding of recognition is conducive to the conceptualization of 
social stigma. Stigma may be seen as establishing a relationship between an attribute to a 
negative stereotype, as a result of which this attribute is considered “deeply discrediting.”14 The 
possessor of the attribute is considered less desirable and “quite thoroughly bad, or dangerous, or 
weak.”15 Thus, he is reduced “from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one.”16 The 
 
13 Ibid. 
14 Goffman, E. (1963). Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 




social response to this unwanted discrepancy is stigmatization17 because of which the stigmatized 
person suffers from “spoiled identity” that “has the effect of cutting him off from society and 
from himself so that he stands a discredited person facing an unaccepting world.”18 As Solanke 
explains, “Identity is spoiled in social settings because stigma ‘obtrudes’ itself in the process of 
social interaction, overwhelming all other attributes and causing people to turn away from the 
holder of the stigma.”19 
Social stigma exists when the following five elements coexist: “labeling, stereotyping, 
separation, status loss, and discrimination occur together in a power situation that allows 
them.”20 Our typical practice or custom is to distinguish one thing from the other and label it 
accordingly. It forces us to determine norms that dictate how to carry out the social selection of 
human differences. However, all societies have this labeling practice, but they vary in what is 
labeled as bad or good because economic, cultural, and political conditions vary according to 
time and place. Following the common practice of valuation, labeled differences are often 
associated with negative stereotypes automatically.21 The persons who have “perceived 
undesirable attributes,”22 such as disability, disease, being black, and so on, are considered 
different from ‘us,’ and they are not “really human.” Due to otherization, a ‘different’ person is 
“reduced in our minds from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one.”23 Due to this 
dehumanization, “a labeled person experiences status loss and discrimination.”24 As a result, 
stigmatized persons are inherently disadvantaged with respect to life chances such as income, 
 
17 Solanke, I. (2017). Discrimination as Stigma: A Theory of Anti-discrimination Law. Portland, OR: Hart 
Publishing. p. 25. 
18 Goffman, op. cit. note 14, p. 19. 
19 Solanke, op. cit. note 17, p. 25. 
20 Link, B.G., & Phelan, J.C. (2001). Conceptualizing Stigma. Annual Review of Sociology. 27, 363-385. p. 377. 
21 Ibid: 369. 
22 Green, G. (2009). The End of Stigma? Changes in the Social Experience of Long-term Illness. London: 
Routledge. p. 20. 
23 Goffman, op. cit. note 14, p. 3. 
24 Link & Phelan, op. cit. note 19, p. 370. 
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education, well-being, and the like. The first inevitable consequence of successful negative 
labeling and stereotyping is a status loss which is “a general downward placement of a person in 
a status hierarchy” that occurs when “[t]he person is connected to undesirable characteristics that 
his or her status in the eyes of the stigmatizer.”25 However, stigma does not occur without the 
presence of power, be it social, economic, and political. 
Connecting this understanding of social stigma with my previous conceptualization of 
recognition, we can say that social stigma as a variation of misrecognition is our orientation to 
one’s evaluative qualities, such as disability, disease, being black, and so on in ways that when 
internalized as less desirable, we become motivated to treat the persons with these qualities 
wrongfully and externalize this motivation by acting accordingly influenced by various 
unacceptable structural elements. 
However, though the current account given of stigma suggests that stigma is always 
wrong, it does not imply that we should understand our dislike for, for example, a person for 
having a significant inclination to murder as a stigma. When we despise a killer or a person with 
a strong proclivity for murder, all five elements of social stigma do not coexist. When we 
correctly label a murderer as a murderer or a person as possessing a murderous mentality, it is at 
the very least not a case of discrimination. Hence, despising someone for having a strong desire 
to murder is not the same as stigmatizing them; it is at most a form of labeling. For this reason, 
the question of whether stigmatizing a person for having a significant inclination to murder is 
right or wrong should not be raised. Instead, we should consider whether we are right to despise 
someone for having a significant inclination to murder. Nevertheless, the answer to this question 
falls beyond the scope of this paper.26 
 
25 Ibid: 371. 
26 I thank an anonymous reviewer of the journal for raising this issue. 
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4. | MISRECOGNITION AND SOCIAL STIGMA DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC 
During the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, many people stigmatize COVID-19 patients and their 
families in Bangladesh.27 In the rest of the paper, I show how this process of stigmatization is an 
instance of misrecognition. In the first section, I explain the five stages of recognition. Cases of 
misrecognition may occur in any one of these stages. When we fail to notice (and thus commit 
to) others’ evaluative features, internalize their normative relevance, realize responsibilities, be 
motivated to act, or externalize through actions, an instance of misrecognition transpires. If it can 
be shown that our stigmatization related to COVID-19 is located in any one of these stages of 
(mis)recognition, it can be successfully claimed that COVID-19 stigma in Bangladesh is an 
instance of misrecognition. 
Why do we stigmatize COVID-19 patients and their families? Bangladesh is a land of 
scarce resources in many respects of our daily life. The healthcare sector is possibly one of the 
most critical areas where the gap between the supply and demand for resources is distinct.28 It 
leads to various discriminatory practices in this sector, which are intensified and vividly exposed 
during the COVID-19 pandemic.29 Due to discrimination, people become skeptical about getting 
treatment once they get infected by the SARS-CoV-2 virus responsible for COVID-19 disease.30 
This skepticism about the healthcare sector may grow a sense of fear and anxiety about their 
lives. So, whenever they see victims of COVID-19,31 they automatically become aware of them 
and label them as a threat to their life. It implies that the evaluative feature of a person being sick 
 
27 Shammi, M., Bodrud-Doza, M., Islam, A.R.M.T., & Rahman, M.M. (2020). COVID-19 Pandemic, 
Socioeconomic Crisis and Human Stress in Resource-limited Settings: A Case from Bangladesh. Heliyon. 6(5), 1-
12. p. 3. 
28 Al-Zaman, M.S. (2020). Healthcare Crises in Bangladesh during the COVID-19 Pandemic. The American Journal 
of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene. 103(4), 1357-1359. p. 1; Hossain, F. (2020). Moral Distress among Healthcare 
Providers and Mistrust among Patients during COVID-19 in Bangladesh. Developing World Bioethics. Advance 
Online Publication. https://doi.org/10.1111/dewb.12291; Shammi et al., op. cit. note 25, pp. 2-3. 
29 Al-Zaman, op. cit. note 28, p. 1; Hossain, op. cit. note 28. 
30 Hossain, op. cit. note 28. 
31 Mahmud, & Islam, op. cit. note 4. 
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is seen as a threat to life. Rather than seeing the victims with loving care, they are believed to be 
a threat to life.32 This labeling is further accentuated when they are automatically internalized as 
reasons to avoid by many people. This internalization of the reason for avoidance is done 
through establishing an association between labeling and negative stereotype of the COVID-19 
patients as dangerous. This automatic association between labeling the COVID-19 victims as a 
threat to life and stereotyping them as dangerous makes people aware of what they must do to 
them. Since the COVID-19 victims carry an undesirable and dangerous attribute, they are to be 
avoided. This realization prompts many non-carriers of the virus to otherize the carriers by 
saying that the latter is ‘different’ from the former. 
This discussion shows that the first three stages of (mis)recognition are parallel to the 
first three components of social stigma. As people are suspicious about whether they can get 
treatment once they become infected with the SARS-CoV-2 virus, often they commit to the 
COVID-19 patients as if they are threats to their existence. Thus, the first instance of 
misrecognition can be located in our understanding of the COVID-19 victims as having 
undesirable and dangerous attributes and hence, unworthy of loving care. When we label them in 
this way, we internalize relevant reasons for avoiding them in ways that demonstrate no loving 
care at all, revealing the second location of misrecognition of the COVID-19 victims. As said, 
this internalization of the reason for avoidance is a consequence of an association between 
labeling and negative stereotype of the COVID-19 patients as dangerous. However, sometimes 
this association is so automatic that we misrecognize and unnecessarily label something as a 
threat to life. This is what happens with the COVID-19 patients. Thus, instead of following 
simple COVID-19 preventive measures that encourage social/physical distancing from SARS-




connection, it is important to note that COVID-19 preventive measures that encourage 
social/physical distancing from SARS-CoV-2 infected persons should not be confused with 
COVID-19-related stigma misrecognition. Instead, these measures should be seen as an 
expression of loving care, which is a form of recognition.33 Besides, when we internalize the 
reasons for avoiding the COVID-19 victims, we realize what we should do to prevent ourselves 
from becoming infected. Unfortunately, because we otherize the SARS-CoV-2 virus carriers by 
saying that they are ‘different’ from ‘us.’ This realization becomes a practice of misrecognition, 
revealing the COVID-19 victims’ third location of misrecognition. 
So far, it is shown that the first three stages of (mis)recognition have a parallel presence 
with the first three components of social stigma. The fourth element of social stigma is parallel to 
the last two stages of (mis)recognition in the context of COVID-19 stigmatization in the 
following way. Once the COVID-19 victims are otherized and identified as dangerous and 
different, people become motivated to treat them differently. In other words, since the COVID-
19 victims are different from us in that they are dangerous, we often feel motivated to treat them 
in ways that show no loving care, indicating the presence of the fourth stage of misrecognition. 
When we can show that something is different from us, we no longer feel uncomfortable treating 
it differently. Different things deserve differential treatments. Hence, being different from 
someone not infected by the SARS-CoV-2 virus, the virus non-carriers are motivated to treat the 
carriers differently. As a result, the victims of this virus are dehumanized and experience status 
loss and discrimination, confirming the presence of the fifth stage of misrecognition. We see 
various instances of such status loss and discrimination during the COVID-19 pandemic in 
Bangladesh. These instances are only a few of an infinite number of cases happening every day 
during the pandemic in Bangladesh. But they are sufficient to testify to my claim that the 
 
33 See the last paragraph of the current section. 
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COVID-19 victims lose their status and fall prey to discrimination to the extent that in 
Bangladesh, they suffer disadvantages with respect to their well-being and treatment by having 
less access to various resources and facilities related to healthcare and others.34 For example, 
various instances reported in numerous national dailies of Bangladesh suggest that many house 
owners and apartment managing committees prohibit tenants and residents who are the COVID-
19 victims and doctors from entering their houses and apartments.35 This is an example of 
discrimination at the individual level. But various instances of structural discrimination are also 
reported. For example, the government creates the VIP quota for COVID-19 treatment.36 Also, it 
is almost impossible for many to get an ICU bed in public hospitals if they do not connect with 
influential people, as the number of ICU beds across the country is very insufficient.37 Various 
reports also show that many doctors and hospitals decline to treat COVID-19 patients.38 In 
multiple newspapers, a report was published that her children left a mother in a jungle once she 
was identified with the COVID-19 symptoms.39 These show the presence of internalized 
discrimination in Bangladesh during the COVID-19 pandemic. Because of these various 
experiences of discrimination in healthcare and other areas of everyday life, people develop what 
Pinel40 calls “stigma consciousness,” for which they form an expectation that they may not get 
treatment once they are identified as COVID-19 victims. It shows that the existing 
discriminatory environment in Bangladesh breeds COVID-19-related stigma. This stigmatized 
 
34 Hossain, op. cit. note 28. 
35 Mahmud & Islam, op. cit. note 4. 
36 Sheikh Russel Hospital to Treat VIP Patients. (2020, April 23). New Age Bangladesh. Retrieved April 15, 2021, 
from https://www.newagebd.net/article/104929/sheikh-russel-hospital-to-treat-vip-patients. 
37 Hossain, op. cit., note 28. 
38 Hossain, op. cit., note 28; Swazo, N.K., Talukder, M.N.H., & Ahsan, M.K. (2020). A Duty to Treat? A Right to 
Refrain? Bangladeshi Physicians in Moral Dilemma during COVID-19. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in 
Medicine. 15. 
39 Mahmud & Islam, op. cit. note 4. 
40 Pinel, E.C. (1999). Stigma Consciousness: The Psychological Legacy of Social Stereotypes. Journal Personality 
and Social Psychology. 76(1), 114-128. 
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environment promotes more discrimination. It can easily be said that there is a causal connection 
between discrimination and social stigma. Also, as social stigma is a variation of misrecognition, 
it is not an exaggeration to claim that the same causal relation exists between misrecognition and 
discrimination. 
Nevertheless, the last element of social stigma is power, without which no component of 
it would reach the level of social stigma.41 Concerning recognition, I have said that such 
structural conditions as cultural, economic, and political work in the background to influence us 
to (mis)recognize certain people’s evaluative qualities. In fact, none of our acts of recognition 
happens without being conditioned by the structural elements. If there were no structural 
elements that play a role in our acts of recognition, these acts would become contentless. In other 
words, various structural elements provide us with content. Different societies have different 
patterns of cultural, economic, and political elements for which different societies value different 
evaluative qualities. As mentioned, being a COVID-19 victim is an evaluative quality that should 
be treated with loving care. Instead, as various examples discussed above show, in Bangladesh, 
they are stigmatized for which they do not have the same access to care for their disease as other 
people. Also, in non-health sectors, they are dehumanized, which is certainly not a feature of 
enjoying participatory parity. Such denial of participatory parity due to stigmatization 
substantiates my claim that COVID-19-related stigmas in Bangladesh and social stigmas as a 
whole are instances of misrecognition that come into existence due to the presence of power, be 
it cultural, economic, and political. 
As mentioned, many COVID-19 preventive measures encourage social/physical 
distancing from SARS-CoV-2 infected persons, given the concerns they pose to public health. Is 
this, in fact, a mistake? We should remember that these positive preventive measures should not 
 
41 Link & Phelan, op. cit. note 19, p. 376. 
 15 
be confused with COVID-19-related stigma misrecognition. Instead, these measures should be 
viewed as an expression of loving care, which is a form of recognition, since they are not 
intended to discriminate against a COVID-19 victim by denying him access to the healthcare 
system. Misrecognition through stigmatization happens when we internalize a COVID-19 victim 
as dangerous, understand him as separable, and are motivated to behave with him in ways that 
dehumanize him and are discriminatory.42 Thus, my reply to the question, “why misrecognition 
of the COVID-19 victims is wrong?” is: it is wrong because the presence of institutionalized 
patterns of economic, cultural, and/or political values causes unjust treatment of them in social 
interaction. Furthermore, this misrecognition is unjustified because it cannot ensure parity of 
participation. Thus, in my view, because of institutionalized patterns, whether cultural, 
economic, or political, the COVID-19 victims are regarded as “the other,” inferior, or excluded, 
remain bereft of having access to the healthcare system, and may become victims of further 
misrecognition. 
5. | CONCLUSION 
This paper shows that the COVID-19-related stigmatization is a variation of the lack of a more 
deep and normative practice of recognition understood as an orientation to our evaluative 
features. Various of our stereotypical behaviors regarding COVID-19 become stigmatized 
practices because of the presence of all elements of social stigma – labeling, stereotyping, 
separation, status loss and discrimination, and power. These components testify that the COVID-
19-related stigmatization is misrecognition. When people stigmatize a COVID-19 victim, they 
orient themselves to his evaluative quality of being vulnerable to the SARS-CoV-2 virus by 
internalizing the victim as dangerous, understanding him as separable, and being motivated to act 
 
42 I would like to thank an anonymous journal reviewer for bringing this issue to my attention. 
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with him differently.43 All this leads the stigmatizers to act in ways that cause the COVID-19 
victims to lose status and suffer discrimination for which they do not experience participatory 
parity in different facets of their lives, rendering the COVID-19-related stigmatization an 
appalling example of misrecognition.44 
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